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Sir Austen Chamberlain’s term of office as British Foreign Secretary between 1924 
and 1929 was one of the longest and most important of the interwar period.  By the 
time of his departure, many were convinced that he had been instrumental in 
brokering one of the most important western European security agreements since the 
First World War, the Treaty of Locarno, in October 1925.  A treaty that was regarded 
at the time as being such a significant diplomatic breakthrough that it was viewed as 
the ‘real’ peace settlement at the end of the First World War between Germany and 
the Allies.  Until his death in 1937, Chamberlain continued to regarded his role in the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Locarno as the high point of his career: an opinion with 
which historians have concurred, despite the fact that many of the same scholars have 
subsequently questioned the long-term diplomatic significance of that agreement.1  
Most assessments of Chamberlain’s role in concluding the Treaty of Locarno and 
indeed of his period as Foreign Secretary as a whole have focussed on the impact of 
his very personal pro-French sympathies on the strategies he pursued.  This aspect of 
Chamberlain’s mind map between 1924 and 1929 was first highlighted by Douglas 
Johnson in the early 1960s in an article that shaped Chamberlain historical reputation 
in foreign affairs for more than a generation.2  Chamberlain’s most recent biographer, 
David Dutton, writing in the mid 1980s, offered a more restrained view of his 
subject’s career at the Foreign Office.3  In particular, Dutton did much to dispel the 
view that Chamberlain was something of a ‘lone wolf’ in the Foreign Office and 
within the Cabinet, arguing that he enjoyed an often excellent relationship with his 
officials.  Dutton’s picture of Chamberlain as the more moderate francophile has 
largely remained unchallenged, although Richard Grayson’s study of Chamberlain’s 
Foreign Secretaryship implores its reader to move away from and Anglo-French focus 
when analysing his subject’s contribution to the debate about western European 
security in the mid 1920s.4  At Locarno, Grayson argues, Chamberlain was 
sympathetic to the security agendas of all of the powers in attendance, especially 
Germany, and he was thus the quintessential European statesman of the period, 
devoted to peace and European reconciliation.  Earlier work on Chamberlain’s 
Locarno diplomacy by the present author has taken issue with some of Grayson’s 
points, especially with his claims concerning the Foreign Secretary’s views on the 
German agenda.5  This work also analysed the way in which Chamberlain’s actions 
were seen by others, especially the view from Berlin as revealed by the British 
ambassador at the time, Lord D’Abernon.  If this perspective is examined, a 
completely different view of Chamberlain’s diplomatic strategy emerges, with very 
few of the nuances he believed to be self-evident in his thinking and in his choice of 
words being understood by those with whom he sought to communicate.  This article 
continues the exploration of this important question of how successful Chamberlain 
was in communicating his diplomatic thinking to others by returning once again to the 
French dimension.  It examines two principal questions.  The first is relationship 
Chamberlain enjoyed with the longest-serving British ambassadors to Paris of the 
interwar period, the Marquess of Crewe (1922-1928), a diplomat about whom a 
surprisingly small amount has been written.6  Yet Sir Charles Petrie, Chamberlain’s 
first biographer, claimed that it was Crewe who was one of the ambassadors that 
brought Chamberlain into the ‘closest touch’ with foreign affairs.7  Indeed, many 
believed that there was such congruity between their thinking on Anglo-French 
relations that when Crewe contemplated retirement in November 1927, rumours 
circulated that Chamberlain would replace him as ambassador.8  Secondly, this article 
will examine the way in which Crewe’s understanding of Anglo-French relations 
impacted on Chamberlain’s thinking on European security debate and its wider 
context.  From this it will be deduced that Crewe played an invaluable role in the 
development of Chamberlain’s strategic thinking.9
 Socially and politically Chamberlain and Crewe were from very different 
backgrounds. Chamberlain, the upper middle class Conservative Midlands parvenu 
son of ‘Radical Joe’, was expected to live up to his father’s expectations of him and 
assume the premiership.  In contrast, Crewe, born in London but of Yorkshire stock, 
was from an aristocratic family with strong links to the nineteenth century seats of 
Liberal power, especially the Gladstone and Rosebery sets.  But despite these 
considerations, the careers of these almost exact contemporaries mirrored each other 
on a number of levels.
  Although not a career diplomatist, 
Crewe’s interactions with Chamberlain over the European security debate and its 
consequences also demonstrate that the Marquess possessed important, mature 
insights into the complex relationship with Britain’s most important European ally. 
10  By the 1920s, both had held high political office but were 
widely regarded as having failed to realise their ambition and potential.  Chamberlain, 
as leader of the Conservative party had apparently thrown away his chance of the 
premiership by resigning over the outcome of the Carlton Club meeting in 1922.  
Although many would argue that achieving the rank of Foreign Secretary was hardly 
an indication of a failed political career, and, indeed, Chamberlain remained proud of 
his achievements when holding this office for the remainder of his life, the questions 
about the soundness of his judgement that surrounded his decision to resign the party 
leadership were never fully dispelled, despite the success of Locarno.  Yet 
Chamberlain’s brilliant diplomatic achievements in 1925 did not secure a lasting role 
at the heart of European security diplomacy for him, with both his French and 
German opposite numbers, Briand and Stresemann, preferring to negotiate 
supplementary agreements with each other and with the Americans rather than with 
Britain.  Chamberlain’s periods of public and private mental turmoil that resulted 
from these frustrations were clearly chronicled in his correspondence with his maiden 
sisters, Ida and Hilda.11
 Crewe’s association with the Gladstonian Liberal party had secured his rapid 
rise in the party in the late 1880s and early 1890s.  And in the decade leading up to the 
outbreak of the First World War, he was appointed Leader of the Liberals in the 
House of Lords in 1911 and Lord Privy Seal on two occasions, 1908-11 and 1912-15.  
Yet Crewe failed to convey the impression that he was a potential future leader of the 
party.
 
12  This was partly due to the fact that, like Chamberlain, Crewe had a natural 
rigidity of manner and personal diffidence that conveyed an unfortunate impression of 
aloofness and dryness.13  Furthermore, in an era when Liberal politics was dominated 
by the oratorical brilliance of Lloyd George, a stammer rendered Crewe painfully 
uncomfortable when speaking in public, his speeches containing ‘prolonged 
moments—almost minutes—of hesitation while he fastidiously chose the correct 
word’.14  Despite these drawbacks, Crewe nevertheless obtained and sustained a 
reputation for sound judgement, solidity and trustworthiness.  ‘He knows his own 
mind’ noted Charles Hobhouse, and ‘is generally practical and progressive’.15  But he 
was also modest about the importance that should be accorded to his advice.  When 
presenting an analysis of the way in which Poincaré viewed the European security 
question in the mid 1920s, Crewe told Chamberlain: ‘You must take these different 
observations for what they are worth, which may not be a great deal.’16  Crewe’s lack 
of personal ambition and relaxed approach meant that he did not tend to be viewed as 
a professional threat by his contemporaries.  Consequently, he was almost universally 
liked, his principal allies being the Conservative peer and former Viceroy of India, 
George Curzon17 and the Liberal leader between 1908-1916, Herbert Asquith, who 
described Crewe as someone ‘whose judgement I rate highest of any of my 
colleagues’.18  His reluctance to speak in public meant that he chose the occasions 
when he did so with care, which earned him the reputation for ‘never interven[ing] 
without effect or ‘speak[ing] at unnecessary length.’19
 Crewe’s natural terseness is also evident in his use of the written word.  Like 
Chamberlain and most of their generation, Crewe wrote a voluminous amount of 
private and official letters.  But while Chamberlain’s private correspondence offers an 
invaluable insight into the workings of the inner man, Crewe’s letters, in contrast, 
seldom reveal anything other than bare factual details or present more than a 
superficial impression of the political and social milieu in which he operated.  During 
his Paris embassy, this overwhelming shyness was reflected in Crewe’s willingness to 
leave most of the day-to-day communication with the French government to his able, 
francophile Minister, Sir Eric Phipps, busying himself instead with the composition of 
his numerous official dispatches.
 
20  The latter provided a full account of the foreign 
policy priorities of all of the French governments that took office during Crewe’s 
embassy, and their quality appears to have been appreciated by their recipients.  
Consequently, Ian Packer’s assessment of Crewe’s role in Paris as being ‘largely 
ornamental’ is, as this article aims to show, somewhat harsh.21 
 There were further dynamics at work in the relationship between Chamberlain 
and Crewe that had a bearing on how they viewed Anglo-French relations.  When 
Crewe assumed the mantel of ambassador to Paris in 1922, he was sixty-four years 
old.  Chamberlain, likewise was sixty-one in the year in which he became Foreign 
Secretary.  Both men had good reason to believe that the best years of their careers 
were behind them.  However, what has been overlooked in all previous assessments 
of Chamberlain’s career at the Foreign Office is that he had managed to reach this age 
and this position without any practical experience of the conduct of foreign policy.  
Indeed, Crewe was the more experienced of the two.  Appointed assistant private 
secretary to Lord Granville, Foreign Secretary in Gladstone’s second ministry in 1883 
on his arrival at Westminster, Crewe rose to the rank of Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in 1908 in the first Asquith government, a post he held for two years.  
Although it can hardly be said that he demonstrated a particular aptitude for foreign 
affairs, having acquired the reputation for being a ‘sound administrator with few 
original ideas.’22
 The circumstances surrounding Crewe’s appointment to the Paris embassy 
also have a bearing on how his contribution to the conduct of Anglo-French relations 
should be assessed.  It was Crewe’s political loyalties that indirectly shaped the 
appointment of his two immediate predecessors: the seventeenth Earl of Derby (1918-
1920) and Lord Hardinge of Penshurst (1920-1922).
  When Chamberlain arrived at the Foreign Office in 1924, Crewe 
had also been in post for two years and had proved himself a steadying influence on 
Anglo-French relations during the tensions surrounding the Ruhr crisis that began in 
January 1923. 
23  As early as 1917, Crewe’s 
solid reliability had led him to be tipped as the successor to the influential francophile, 
Sir Francis Bertie, who had occupied the post of ambassador to Paris 1905-1918.24  
Indeed, Bertie hoped that Crewe would succeed him, describing him as ‘a great noble 
yet democratic in his views’ with a natural sympathy for the French that ‘would 
render him irresistible to them.’25  However, Crewe’s friendship with Asquith 
precluded him from accepting the post as long as Lloyd George remained Prime 
Minister.26  According to Harold Nicolson, the Foreign Office official and historian, it 
was Crewe, along with Curzon, who most accurately predicted the ‘disasters which 
would result were Mr Lloyd George to obtain an absolutely autocratic control of 
foreign policy.’27  Derby’s embassy is important because he set the precedent that 
Crewe was destined to follow of appointing a man outside the Diplomatic Service to 
the Paris embassy.28  Although Derby’s biographer was to describe his period as 
ambassador to Paris as marking the pinnacle of his career in public life, Derby himself 
was initially anxious to ensure that his embassy was a short as possible.29  While he 
later warmed to the task, he remained in post only as a favour to Lloyd George and 
was often at odds with Curzon.30  But it was the characteristics that Derby shared with 
Crewe that rendered his embassy an ultimate success, especially his ‘mental sanity, 
his physical solidity, his wealth and ancient lineage…’.31  Hardinge, Derby’s 
successor, was, like Crewe, naturally reticent, but was not surrounded by officials 
with Phipps’ ability, francophile sympathies and gregarious nature.   When Derby’s 
recall to London was announced, British and French officials wanted to ensure that 
his successor would offer a more optimistic view of the potential for collaboration 
between the two countries.  Significantly, it was Hardinge who suggested Crewe’s 
appointment as his successor, although he was later to claim that he did so because 
‘nobody else suitable could be found.’32  But this was advice that Curzon was happy 
to receive, because by the time of the fall of the Lloyd George government in the 
autumn of 1922, Crewe had become one of the Foreign Secretary’s ‘most trusted 
friends.’33  As far as Curzon was concerned, Crewe’s brief as incoming ambassador 
was two-fold.  First, he should endeavour to persuade the French that continuing to 
view Germany with hostility and suspicion was likely to have a self-defeating effect 
on European security negotiations.  Second, that he be aware that the maintenance of 
a strong entente between Britain and France was a sine qua non for a workable 
agreement to be reached on this issue.34
 Significantly, both Chamberlain and Crewe were committed francophiles.  
Chamberlain spoke French fluently having completed part of his education at the 
Ecole des Sciences Politiques in Paris.
 
35  Crewe ‘spoke French better than any 
Englishman’, and unlike the Foreign Secretary, retained an academic interest in the 
study of French history, politics and culture throughout his period in public life, 
adding substantially to his library at Crewe Hall during his Paris embassy.36  When 
Chamberlain arrived at the Foreign Office in the autumn of 1924, Crewe was already 
accustomed to working with two foreign secretaries, Curzon and Ramsay MacDonald, 
who placed a great deal of store on conducting diplomacy through personal 
communication, either by private letter or through face-to-face conversation.37
However, it was a different dynamic that partly governed their general 
perception of the Anglo-French relationship between 1924 and 1928.  Although it has 
been suggested that Chamberlain was not blind to the diplomatic problems created by 
the French government’s often-obsessive concern with security, it is nevertheless true 
that the Foreign Secretary frequently relied on his own personal instincts when 
  The 
effectiveness of Chamberlain’s relationship with Crewe thus can partly be attributed 
to the similarities of their preferred working styles, with the Foreign Secretary placing 
a great deal of emphasis on his personal rapport with his French opposite number, 
Aristide Briand.   
dealing with this matter.38  In a speech in the House of Commons in March 1925, 
Chamberlain stated that ‘No nation can live, as we live, within twenty miles of the 
shores of the Continent of Europe and remain indifferent to the peace and security of 
the Continent.’39  Inheriting the post of Foreign Secretary at a time when the ongoing 
crisis concerning the occupation of the Ruhr had left Anglo-French relations at their 
lowest ebb for more than a decade, Chamberlain believed that his personal affinity 
with France and with the French world view would be instrumental in rebuilding that 
relationship.  Crewe’s general view of the significance of the Entente Cordiale was, in 
contrast, much less sentimental and reveals a natural disinclination towards a 
collectivist approach towards diplomatic problem solving.  In March 1925, he advised 
that: ‘The day we show that we intend to “plough our lonely furrow” and to evade any 
kind of continental commitments, that fear will assume panic proportions, and, 
coupled with the military preponderance above referred to, together with the 
realisation that that preponderance is necessarily and steadily dwindling, may well, 
indeed is bound, I fear, to lead to some supreme act of folly which may have 
disastrous consequences for the peace and for the economic stability of Europe.’ 40
Two years later, in a rare comment on the protracted disarmament negotiations 
at Geneva, Crewe argued that the French harboured some important misconceptions 
about British policy towards Europe that had existed since the outbreak of the First 
World War.  Britain did not go to war in 1914 simply to defend Belgian neutrality or 
to ‘rescue’ France.  Nor was it true that without British assistance, France would have 
‘lost the war’.  Instead, Britain took up arms because ‘if we had stood aside in 1914, 
and the Germans had become the undoubted masters of Europe, our turn would have 
come next, even to the point of our probably losing command of the sea.’
 
41  While he 
agreed that European security and disarmament were of central importance to the 
British government, such matters should be primarily discussed to protect British 
interests against a potentially resurgent Germany.  Bolstering the entente with France 
should not necessarily be the first priority.  Furthermore, France’s blossoming 
relationship with the successor states in Eastern Europe, especially Hungary and 
Poland, should be encouraged by the British government and viewed as a way of 
moving away from ‘our being represented as simply the saviours of France’.42
Nevertheless, the negotiations of the Treaty of Locarno in 1925 also provides 
other important means of assessing the Crewe and Chamberlain’s view of the wider 
context of the Anglo-French relationship.  Both men’s instinct was that the British 
government should begin the process of creating western European security through 
bilateral negotiations, although, as this article will reveal, that was only occasionally 
evident in their correspondence with each other.  Where they differed was over with 
which country that should be.  Although Chamberlain later embraced the idea of a 
tripartite agreement with Germany, his preferred course of action had been to 
conclude a treaty of mutual guarantee with France that would later be extended to 
include Germany.  Crewe, on the other hand, believed that the British government 
should be willing to give greater acknowledgement to the fact that the most recent 
impetus for a multilateral security pact had come from Berlin, not from Paris.
   
43  It 
was thus important that the British government focus on German suggestions and 
requirements and weave those of France into the process of negotiation only as and 
when they fitted the Anglo-German agenda.  In his thinking, Crewe seems to have 
been influenced more by the thinking of his opposite number in Berlin, Lord 
D’Abernon, who was an early advocate of a policy of reconciliation with Germany, 
than by the priorities of the Foreign Secretary.44  In March 1925, Crewe reminded 
Chamberlain that: ‘It must be borne in mind that France is now, and will be for the 
next few years at any rate, in a position, both on land and in the air, of overwhelming 
military preponderance over Germany.’45  Crewe’s opinions thus provide further 
indication of the extent to which Chamberlain’s Anglo-French-centric approach to the 
security question did set him apart from his ambassadorial advisers and from the 
majority of the Cabinet.46  It was also an ironic situation.  For it was Chamberlain 
who began the process of passing D’Abernon’s dispatches to Crewe during the early 
weeks of the security pact negotiations in exasperated response to the German 
government’s insistence that there should be not discussion between London and 
Paris of the content of the note until the British response had been made.47
In his correspondence with D’Abernon, Chamberlain was much less confident 
that a multilateral security pact that included Germany as a signatory power from the 
outset would yield results than he was in his communications with Crewe.  As early as 
February 1925, when the French government were considering the first German note, 
Chamberlain told the Marquess that ‘in the circumstances of to-day a guarantee of the 
Eastern frontiers of France and Belgium by Great Britain would be rendered a much 
more practical policy if Germany was associated with it.’ 
 
48  It is important to 
consider that Chamberlain’s confidence also partly stemmed from dispatches from 
Crewe the month before that had emphasised the French government’s desire to 
become part of the security negotiations as soon as possible, the ambassador having 
reported that the French Chamber had listened to Herriot ‘in almost religious silence’ 
when he had ‘addressed himself with great emotion to his British friends across the 
Channel about security…’.49  And mindful of his ability to influence the Foreign 
Secretary’s spirits, as the security negotiations progressed, Crewe endeavoured to 
broaden Chamberlain’s vision.  To persuade him to move away from the idea that a 
security guarantee that also embraced France’s Eastern European allies ‘was not 
worth the bones of a British Grenadier.’50
 Crewe’s desire to maintain pressure on Chamberlain to embrace a multilateral 
approach to the question of a western European security pact also stemmed from his 
knowledge that the Foreign Secretary was in close communication with his opposite 
number in London, Aimé de Fleuriau.
 
51  The French ambassador was initially 
sceptical about the advisability of including Germany from the outset of the 
negotiations and was not averse to making this point bluntly to Chamberlain during 
their sometimes daily conversations, arguing that the security pact should be used to 
‘take a part or parts of the Treaty of Versailles and to complete and confirm and 
explain them’ in ‘the spirit of 1919’.52  To persuade the French government to 
encourage Fleuriau and Chamberlain to adopt a more progressive view of the 
potential of the pact, Crewe set out his own views on the optimum way to conduct the 
negotiations in a long memorandum that he sent to the Foreign Secretary in March 
1925.53  A document which he also used as ammunition to lobby Blum and Herriot, 
but whose effectiveness was diminished by the popular reception accorded to 
statements by Poincaré that if Germany signed a security pact it would ‘add nothing’ 
to her signature of the Treaty of Versailles.54
 The Treaty of Locarno also made provision for the admission of Germany into 
the League of Nations, and it was this issue that dominated the correspondence 
between Chamberlain and Crewe after the signature of the treaty in October 1925 
until September 1926, when Germany entered the League and, more significantly, 
joined the permanent membership of the League Council.  The intervening months 
saw Chamberlain at the centre of an international crisis that had at its heart his desire 
to use the League to promote French security interests.  Specifically, the Foreign 
 
Secretary believed that one other power, preferably a Great Power, that was not 
unsympathetic to French security needs should also be admitted to permanent 
membership of the League Council at the same time as Germany.55  As he had done 
during the security pact negotiations, Crewe outlined his views in a lengthy 
memorandum, which he sent to Chamberlain in April 1926.56  Again, Crewe took a 
wider view of the situation that the Foreign Secretary, who ploughed forward by 
responding to the individual objections of the non-permanent members to his 
preferred strategy as they arose.  Much better, Crewe argued, for the British 
government to ‘take a prompt and bold step’ and set out a comprehensive plan for the 
complete reform of the structure of the League Council.  Before this could happen, the 
question of Great Power status, so central to Chamberlain’s diplomatic thinking, 
needed to be re-examined.57  This nebulous concept had hitherto been synonymous 
with ‘mere force’, a concept that was out of keeping with the entire ethos of the 
League.  Furthermore, if that was an accurate definition, was it appropriate to regard 
Germany as a Great Power?  After all, the aspects of the Treaty of Versailles that 
restricted the size of the German military remained in force, untouched by the 
Locarno treaty.  This apparently anti-German statement by Crewe was, however, part 
of a wider point that he was making about the way in which the League Council 
operated and should not necessarily be seen as being inconsistent with his other views 
on the European security question.  Crewe believed that the cause of the League 
Council crisis lay in the insistence of all of the powers concerned on basing their 
claim to permanent membership on their historic but not necessarily their current 
status in world affairs.  On that basis, the British and French claim to permanent 
League Council membership remained sound because both powers continued to enjoy 
significant global influence through their empires.  In this respect, it is notable that 
Crewe, like most of his generation, viewed Britain significantly more as an imperial 
power than as a European power.  That said, somewhat paradoxically, Crewe then 
argued that it was important for the British government to realise that even since the 
end of the First World War, the premises that underpinned international diplomacy 
had evolved, that ‘the restriction of permanent membership, present or future, to the 
countries formerly composing the Concert of Europe, with the special addition of 
Japan and the United States, is not treated as axiomatic by the world at large.’58  
Recommending that a copy of his paper be sent to Cecil, Crewe outlined a number of 
possible scenarios for reform but the idea that appealed to him most – that the League 
Council would only be constituted when it needed to take action and would be made 
up only of powers that had an interest in the resolution of the dispute in question that 
would be appointed by the League Assembly – also suggests that his thinking was 
significantly influenced by nineteenth century ideas about balance of power 
diplomacy.  This was because ‘there are not many conceivable disputes arising in any 
part of the world in which such Powers as Great Britain or France would admit 
themselves to be altogether uninterested.’59  Chamberlain was not unreceptive to 
Crewe’s ideas, but anticipated that any attempt to reform away permanent 
membership of the League Council was likely to be vetoed by the Italians and by the 
Japanese.60
 The delicate nature of the relations between Britain, France and Italy, an 
improvement in which was so vital to the continued success of the Locarno treaty, 
formed the basis of an important strand of Chamberlain’s correspondence with Crewe 
throughout 1926 and early 1927.  Since the Paris Peace Conference, there had been 
diplomatic tension between France and Italy concerning naval parity in the 
Mediterranean, colonial expansion and French support for Yugoslavian territorial 
 
ambitions in the Balkans.61  While Briand and Stresemann were meeting in Thoiry to 
broker a further Franco-German entente, Chamberlain met Mussolini at Livorno in the 
autumn of 1926 for general talks about foreign and strategic policy.62  Chamberlain 
was anxious to convey to the Italian dictator that Britain and France spoke with one 
voice on issues concerning Italo-French relations and that discussing matters with him 
was tantamount to negotiating with Briand.  However, what is significant is that in 
persuading the French of the merits of this argument, Chamberlain entrusted the task 
to Phipps and not to Crewe.  Indeed, the latter appears to have acted as little more 
than a conduit between Phipps and Chamberlain.  Specifically, Phipps was to 
convince the able, influential but consistently anti-Italian head of the Quai d’Orsay, 
Philippe Berthelot, that it was important to the maintenance of the ‘spirit of Locarno’ 
that the French government acknowledge Italy’s status as a Great Power.63  On this 
matter, Phipps made slow progress, but was eventually able to report in December 
1927 that the French government would consider signing a non-aggression and 
arbitration pact with Italy.64
 To Crewe, Chamberlain was much more inclined to express his private views 
about the progress of the negotiations than to ask him to become involved in them 
himself.  In November 1926, for example, he told Crewe that he thought that Briand 
was as much to blame for the poor state of Italo-French relations as Mussolini.  As a 
result, continuing in the spirit of the ‘honest broker’ of European security, 
  But despite his rhetoric about the importance of the four 
principal Locarno powers working in tandem in a partnership of equals, the fact that 
Chamberlain entrusted these difficult and sensitive negotiations to the second in 
command at the British embassy in Paris and not to the ambassador reveals something 
of the importance the Foreign Secretary accorded to the state of diplomatic relations 
between Italy and France. 
Chamberlain said that ‘…I shall keep a watchful eye on the course of events and, if I 
think that any words from me would be useful, they will not be lacking…’.65  Yet 
despite Chamberlain’s statements about playing a useful role in improving Italo-
French relations, it is clear from his conversations with Fleuriau that he had no 
concrete ideas of his own on how to resolve the tensions.  Indeed, the Cabinet had 
made it clear that the British government did not with to offer a further agreement to 
France and Italy that could involve a commitment of military or economic 
resources.66  Thus in this example of post-Locarno diplomacy, we have a further 
example of the treaty failing to bring about a fundamental long-term change in the 
spirit in which diplomacy was conducted between the four powers that had been and 
were to prove to be so central to the maintenance of peace in Europe during the 
interwar period, Britain, France, Germany and Italy.  But even as Crewe prepared for 
retirement in the summer of 1928, however, Chamberlain continued to send him 
official dispatches that promoted what George Grün later termed the ‘myth of 
Locarno.’67
 The correspondence between Crewe and Chamberlain is also notable for what 
they did not discuss.  There is a general absence of debate about the disarmament 
negotiations at Geneva or, indeed, general policy on this subject.  Several 
explanations can be offered for this.  The first is that the Foreign Secretary knew that 
the French government did not take Crewe into its confidence when discussing policy 
on this matter.  Furthermore, Chamberlain knew that the Marquess did not share his 
view that it was Germany from which the most likely challenge to European peace 
was most likely to come.  Instead, Chamberlain preferred to take Fleuriau into his 
confidence, telling him, for example, that ‘a war between France and England was at 
present time improbable to the extent of being impossible’.  At the same time, he was 
 
nevertheless aware that ‘the French had an immense superiority over us in the air arm, 
and however friendly our relations were with a neighbour, one could not wholly 
ignore their armament when considering one’s own’.68
 Chamberlain’s willingness to concentrate on American disarmament 
requirements during the Geneva Disarmament Conference demonstrated in part how 
the emphasis had shifted by the end of Crewe’s embassy away from an Anglo-French 
focus on the interpretation and implementation of the wider implications of the Treaty 
of Versailles towards one that embraced a greater role for the United States in 
European affairs.  This was something that Briand, in fact, grasped quicker than 
Chamberlain, who, despite his involvement in the Geneva Disarmament Conference, 
  Reports of the majority of 
Chamberlain’s conversations with Fleuriau were relayed to Crewe for information as 
a matter of routine, but seldom contained any additional comment from the Foreign 
Secretary.  Nor did Crewe ever feel compelled to comment on their content.  On the 
occasions when Chamberlain was unable to see Fleuriau, the Foreign Office 
Permanent Under Secretary and future ambassador to Paris, Sir William Tyrrell, 
deputised.  Indeed, if all of the sources of information concerning Chamberlain’s 
thoughts and attitudes towards Anglo-French relations are examined, especially in the 
post-Locarno era, it is his reports of his conversations with Fleuriau and his letters to 
Tyrrell that reveal more about his personal opinions.  But Crewe was important to 
Chamberlain’s thinking because they shared a similar understanding and appreciation 
of the dynamics of French politics and foreign policy which helped facilitate some of 
the Foreign Secretary’s most significant dialogues about diplomatic strategy.  A 
debate that frequently extended beyond conventional discussions of the foreign 
policies of Britain and France, as their correspondence concerning the League Council 
Crisis, discussed above, reveals. 
found it difficult to accept that in the post-Locarno era, the French government placed 
as much store on closer relations with the United States as it did with Britain. 
Chamberlain was frequently left behind in this process. This was partly because of his 
inability to see the need to contextualize the success of Locarno within a wider debate 
that reviewed the remainder of the Treaty of Versailles.  Again illustrating the 
importance of Chamberlain’s relationship with Crewe to the Foreign Secretary’s 
strategic thinking, it was from Crewe, and not from Briand, that the latter’s plan to 
work with his American opposite number, Frank Kellogg, on a pact to outlaw war in 
January 1928 were revealed.69
 Some may argue that engaging in a detailed analysis of the relationship 
between a Foreign Secretary and one of his ambassadors creates so narrow a focus 
that it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions that extend beyond an analysis of 
their personal rapport.  However, it is entirely appropriate when writing about the 
career of Austen Chamberlain.  More than any other occupant of the Foreign Office 
during the interwar period, Chamberlain did more to revive what pre-war diplomatists 
termed the ‘old diplomacy’, with its emphasis on personal knowledge and private 
negotiation.  But for Chamberlain, this personal approach to the conduct of diplomacy 
was not a crude instrument but was carefully managed, creating a multi-layered 
approach that matched individuals to tasks.  Mention has been made, although space 
had precluded detailed discussion of the roles played by Fleuriau, Berthelot and 
Phipps in shaping the way in which the British and French governments viewed each 
other’s foreign policy strategy between 1924 and 1928.  From this, is it possible to say 
that Crewe influenced Chamberlain’s thinking about European security?  There is no 
evidence either contained in their private or in their official correspondence that it was 
the Marquess and the Marquess alone who changed Chamberlain’s mind on any 
     
specific issue.  But Crewe’s ability to bring influence to bear was more subtle and 
reflected the assessments of him by Curzon and Asquith before the First World War.  
Unlike Chamberlain, who frequently spoke and wrote with great passion about 
foreign affairs, Crewe’s strength was that he displayed none of these traits.  Instead, 
he presented an unruffled, reliable consistency of approach and argument that 
Chamberlain frequently eventually came to accept.  This set Crewe apart from 
D’Abernon, although this article had demonstrated that the Marquess held the views 
of the British ambassador to Berlin in high regard.  D’Abernon was much more like 
Chamberlain both in personality and in his approach to presenting a diplomatic case.  
That, combined with Chamberlain’s personal scepticism about the long-term German 
motives for involvement in the security negotiations, resulted in a much more volatile 
relationship, which, in turn, had a more negative impact on Anglo-German relations.70  
It is also evident that Chamberlain appreciated Crewe’s quieter qualities.  Writing on 
the ambassador’s final departure from Paris, he commended Crewe for being ‘an able 
and willing helper’ who had ‘enhanced the dignity of a great post’.  That Crewe’s 
greatest strength was his ‘judgement and courage’ but that more than anything, he had 
succeeded in keeping the discussion of Britain’s relations with France ‘within 
bounds.’71  But in making this assessment, Chamberlain was perhaps once again 
guilty of placing too much emphasis on his personal rapport with an ambassador 
when making an assessment of their importance.  While Crewe was undoubtedly a 
steadying influence on the way in which the British and French governments viewed 
each other during the mid 1920s, when his embassy began, relations between Britain 
and France were at their lowest ebb since the end of the First World War.  When his 
embassy came to an end, the negotiation of the Locarno treaty had done much to 
repair that damage, but did not result in the entente between Britain and France 
emerging as the driving force behind further attempts to prevent a second European 
war.  The dynamics of the relationship between Stresemann and Briand and the 
latter’s own visions of how to bring long-term security to France suggest that it would 
be unreasonable to hold Crewe or, indeed, Chamberlain, entirely responsible for this 
change in the nature of the Entente Cordiale.  But the question remains: how 
effectively did they respond to this?  Chamberlain was, of course, subject to the 
constraints of the Cabinet and the House of Commons in his actions and these factors 
have to remain paramount when engaging in a counterfactual debate about the 
strategies he adopted.  But Crewe was a more original thinker about diplomacy than 
Chamberlain.72  He was part of a generation of aristocratic politicians with liberal 
sympathies who realised that the First World War had brought about a change in the 
way in which international diplomacy needed to be conducted but who found it 
difficult to accept that that same conflict had also altered Britain’s position as a world 
power.  His enthusiasm for the League and for giving that organisation a more 
democratic role in international affairs in the years immediately after the signature of 
the Treaty of Locarno, reveals that Crewe had much in common with men such as 
Lord Robert Cecil, President of the League of Nations Union and the leading 
promoter of the work of the League in Britain.  Indeed it was Cecil’s brother, the 
Fourth Marquess of Salisbury, who described Crewe as ‘the last of the Whig 
statesmen.’73  Less given to flourishes of rhapsodic prose than Chamberlain, Crewe 
nevertheless was as aware as the Foreign Secretary of the size of the stakes during the 
security negotiations.  Reflecting on them in 1940, after the Fall of France, Crewe 
wrote that he continued to view his work in Paris a decade and a half earlier as 
important because ‘war smothers all the aspirations of Liberalism’.74
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